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In his Frankel Lecture, Outsourcing Politics: The Hostile
Takeover of Our Hollowed-Out Political Parties, Sam Issacharoff
suggests that legal changes have systematically disabled the
leadership of political parties from exercising sway over their
candidates. As a result, party leaders cannot create the necessary
incentives for moderation, and office holders are being swept away
from the center by the gales of polarization.
This Commentary suggests that, at bottom, Issacharoff isn't
asking the right question. His Lecture asks how we can reduce the
effects of polarization, when the real question may be whether we
can. It's possible that legal changes contributed to rising levels of
polarization, but it's also possible that the two phenomena occurred
simultaneously or, at the very least, that the latter matters a good
deal more than the former. Issacharoff offers a cheerful tale-give
more power to the party leaders, and they'll rein in the extremists.
But there are at least two other possible endings to his story. The
first is that even an empowered leadership structure simply can't
exercise enough control over its members to make a difference. The
second is that it is possible for the leadership to exercise control over
its members, but that shift will only ensure that the leadership is
targeted by the same forces now pushing candidates to the
extremes. If the DNC has more power, extremists will target the
DNC, and the results will be little different.
* J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Thanks to Samir Doshi for
excellent research assistance and to David Schleicher for great comments.
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Issacharoff, in short, wants to give the party leaders a better
hand to play. But it doesn't matter how many trump cards you
hold if you are playing in a hurricane.
COMMENTARY
Sam Issacharoff's talk demonstrates why he is revered within
our field. He is both one of election law's founding parents and one
of its most insightful commentators. Sam has generated countless
ideas in the field he helped found, all of them delivered with
panache. His ideas haven't just influenced the field; they have
given it shape and form. When we teach, when we write, when we
research, we are traveling the intellectual roads that Sam helped
map.
I should also say how many of us in the younger generation
are grateful to him for his mentorship and support. Mind you, Sam
definitely falls in the "tough love" side of the mentoring scale. He
once summarized his comments on a junior's paper as follows:
"Wrong on the facts, wrong on the law, wrong on the policy. You
might wonder what is right about this paper. There's something,
but the author doesn't know what it is." That sounds tough, and it
was. But it perfectly embodied Sam as a mentor. He respects
younger scholars enough not to pull his punches. You know where
he stands, which means his praise-while hard-won-is that much
more valuable. And I should note that a generous soul lurks
beneath Sam's tough exterior. Sam worked very hard a few years
later to help that very same young scholar lateral to a better
school. Even now, he's keeping a watchful eye over one of my
students, purely out of the goodness of his heart.
This paper is extraordinarily Issacharoff-like.1 One of Sam's
signature moves is to use the insights of private law to illuminate
election law. Indeed, Sam's Politics as Markets, coauthored with
Rick Pildes-which I view as the finest article written in the
field-does exactly that, leveraging the insights of antitrust to
identify the appropriate conditions of judicial intervention.2
Relying on two scholars of the 1930s-V.O. Key and Ronald
Coase-he explains the current bereft state of the party leadership
using a "make or buy" analogy.3 It's easy to imagine extensions of
Sam's insights. For instance, I can see how the analogy helps in
identifying which kinds of activities can be safely outsourced,
1. Samuel Issacharoff, Outsourcing Politics: Political Parties and the Theory of the
Firm, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 845 (2017).
2. See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets:
Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998).
3. Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 851-61.
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especially when thinking about more recent work on the benefits
of team production and the nature of assets.4 Transaction costs,
after all, aren't the only factor influencing the make-or-buy
choice.5 Firms also choose to "make" rather than "buy" essential
parts of the product in order to avoid holdout problems. Now think
about the Koch brothers' efforts to create voter lists-an essential
part of politicking-and ask yourself whether the GOP should
view those activities as a threat or a favor.6
In the spirit of Issacharoff-Sam would be absolutely insulted
if I pulled my punches-I want to ask whether the reforms that
emerge naturally from Sam's argument are likely to succeed. To
be fair to Sam, he doesn't insist that changing the law can put the
genie back into the bottle, so, like Bob Bauer, I do worry about
"shadow boxing."7 But Sam plainly thinks that changes in the law
weakened the parties, so I think it's fair to assume that he thinks
changes in the law can strengthen them as well, even if we can't
return to square one. Put more succinctly, Sam is worried about
how many trump cards party leaders have in their hand under the
current law. My worry is that it's not clear that cards matter when
you are playing your game in a hurricane. Is it possible that Sam
is right on the facts, right on the law, and right on the policy but
ultimately answering the wrong question?
Sometimes academics can be passive aggressive. When they
raise "questions," they really mean "attacks." That is decidedly not
my intention. In Gertrude and Claudius, John Updike's brilliant
retelling of Hamlet, he described the king as all answers, no
questions.8 Here I am just the opposite. I'm not sure if Sam is
wrong. But I'm not sure he is right, either.
To be sure, Sam's claim is deeply intuitive. He thinks that
legal changes have systematically disabled the party leadership
4. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs,
and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777-81, 791-95 (1972); Benjamin
Klein, Robert G. Crawford, & Armen A. Aichian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents,
and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. LAW & ECON. 297, 298-99, 325 (1978).
5. Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 851-53; see also B. G. Dale & M. T. Cunningham,
The Importance of Factors Other Than Cost Considerations in Make or Buy Decisions, 4
INT'L J. OPERATIONS & PRODUCTION MGMT., no. 3, 1984, at 43; Harry Gross, Make or Buy
Decision in Growing Firms, 41 ACCT. REV. 745 (1966).
6. For an analysis of these worries, see Jon Ward, The Koch Brothers and the




7. Robert F. Bauer, White House Counsel under President Barack Obama,
Commentary at the University of Houston Law Center Houston Law Review's Annual
Frankel Lecture: The Parties' Struggles in the Political "Market": Can Regulation Solve
This Problem-Should It, and if so, How? (Nov. 4, 2016).
8. JOHN UPDIKE, GERTRUDE AND CLAUDIUS 59 (2000).
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from exercising sway over its candidates.9 As a result, party
leaders cannot create the necessary incentives for moderation, and
office holders are being swept away from the center by the gales of
polarization.10 The parties are getting "fragmented," to use the
metaphor Rick Pildes has put forward and Issacharoff adopts."
That seems right on the facts. It's plainly true that parties have
played a moderating role in the past, it's plainly true that they
have fewer tools to do so today, and it's plainly true that office
holders are now being pushed to extremes.12 Issacharoff's
argument also seems right on the law-changes in the legal
regime have surely affected what kind of power the leadership
wields over its members.13 And it seems right on the policy-we
are on the verge of a complete breakdown in Congress precisely
because office holders are so polarized.14
I nonetheless worry that, at bottom, Issacharoff isn't asking
the right question. As John Hart Ely pointed out of Alexander
Bickel, "No answer is what the wrong question begets."5 Sam's
paper asks how we can reduce the effects of polarization, when the
real question may be whether we can.16 It's possible that legal
changes contributed to rising levels of polarization; but it's also
possible that the two phenomena occurred simultaneously or, at
the very least, that the latter matters a good deal more than the
former. I take it that Bob Bauer-who suggests that Issacharoff
ought to focus on what is, not on what ought to be-may harbor
some of the same worries.'7 Sam, who is usually quite cynical
9. Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 875-79.
10. See id. at 848-55.
11. Id. at 848 & n.2; Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political
Fragmentation, and the Decline ofAmerican Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 830 (2014).
12. See generally Issacharoff, supra note 1.
13. Id. at 858-59.
14. See id. at 856.
15. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
72 (1980).
16. Others have asked similar questions. See, e.g., Hans J.G. Hassell, The Party's
Primary: Party Elites' Control of Nominations for the US House and Senate 191 (2016)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Cornell College at http://people.cornellcollege.edu/h
hassell/Scholarly/20Work/The%20Party's%20Primary/2OManuscript.pf [https://perma.cc/
WBR8-TLP7]) ("Do parties always prefer more moderate candidates, or is the preference for
more moderate candidates merely the result of the current network of individuals that
surround the party apparatus? If it is the latter, we should be more cautious about investing
more responsibility in parties. Given more strength, battles for the direction of the country
would become battles waged almost exclusively within the parties as policy demanders
attempt to gain control of the party organization to use to their advantage. Party
organizations are not immune to capture by different groups within the party who then use
them to pursue their policy agendas.").
17. See Robert F. Bauer, The Parties' Struggles in the Political "Market`- Can
Regulation Solve This Problem-Should It, and if so, How?, 54 HOuS. L. REV. 881, 886 (2017).
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about reform proposals, offers an uncharacteristically cheerful
tale. Give more power to the party leaders, he tells us, and they'll
rein in the extremists. But there are at least two other possible
endings to Sam's story. The first is that even an empowered
leadership structure simply can't exercise enough control over its
members to make a difference.18 The second is that it is possible
for the leadership to exercise control over its members, but that
shift will only ensure that the leadership is targeted by the same
forces now pushing candidates to the extremes. To make the point
more concretely, if the DNC has more power, extremists will target
the DNC. If state parties hold greater sway over nominations, they
will become sites of political contestation. And the results will be
little different.
Let me begin by noting that I don't doubt that, on average, the
party leadership has more incentives to moderate than individual
candidates. But will those incentives be enough in a world as
polarized as ours? The evidence is thin. Even the work of La Raja
and Schaffner,19 on which Sam primarily relies,20 has been heavily
criticized for its methodology and because it runs against the
results of other studies.21 Moreover, the study necessarily tries to
capture what's occurring now. As I will argue, the harder question
is whether changes in the law will change the incentives of party
leaders going forward.22
Perhaps it's not surprising that there's so little evidence that
party leaders today (and, more importantly, tomorrow) can be
forces of moderation. Party leaders may have the same incentives
for moderation as party leaders of the past, but they are presiding
over quite different parties these days. Donors function
18. That is, absent draconian measures, the leadership will lack enough power to
make a difference. We could, of course, deploy draconian measures, but it's not clear the
game would be worth the candle.
19. RAYMOND J. LA RAJA & BRIAN F. SCHAFFNER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND POLITICAL
POLARIZATION: WHEN PURISTS PREVAIL 2-5 (2015).
20. Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 862.
21. See, e.g., David Schultz, Money, Equality and Political Polarization in American
Politics: Hasen's Plutocrats United and La Raja and Schaffner's Campaign Finance and
Political Polarization, 15 ELECTION L.J. 263 (2016) (book review) (challenging La Raja and
Schaffner's methodology and the generalizability of their study); Lee Drutman, The Debate
over State Polarization and Campaign Finance Laws Continues, BROOKINGS INST. (July 16,
2015), https://www.brookings.edulblog/fixgov/2015/07/16/the-debate-over-state-polarization-
and-campaign-finance-laws-continues/ [https://perma.ccIY39V-DPET] (challenging La Raja
and Schaffner's methodology and arguing their conclusions are inconsistent with other
studies).
22. Infra notes 37-39.
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differently.23 Seats are won differently.24 Candidates are terrified
of being primaried.25 And polarization hasn't just infected donors
and party activists, but voters themselves.26
Moreover, the forces driving fragmentation are powerful.
Political scientists don't agree about why we've polarized, but no
one has identified a source of polarization that would be easy to
remedy. Let me name just a few of the leading candidates:27 The
media environment has changed fundamentally.28 Deep and
persistent economic inequality may also be driving the changes we
see.29 The parties have realigned themselves with ideological
groupings outside of politics. 3 0 The donors and party activists who
fuel party activities are themselves highly polarized.31 At the very
least, these forces run so deep that they are affecting democracies
everywhere, which makes it very hard to attribute them to any
particular feature of American democracy, let alone any particular
feature of party regulation.32 Moreover, the effects of these shifts
are ubiquitous. Party activists and, more importantly, party
donors have become more ideological and more extreme.33 And the
mere threat of being "primaried" has sent even moderate
Republicans lurching to the right or simply fleeing politics
altogether.34 We may even be seeing the same phenomenon
emerging on the Democratic side, with Bernie Sanders's
unexpectedly strong run at the presidential nomination forcing
Hillary Clinton to the left.
Given the power of the forces at work, there are two worries
you might have about Issacharoff's proposals-two worries that
23. See Michael S. Kang, The Brave New World ofParty Campaign Finance Law, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 531, 601-02 (2016).
24. David Schleicher, Things Aren't Going That Well Over There Either: Party
Polarization and Election Law in Comparative Perspective, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 433,
454-55 (2015).
25. See Michael Tomasky, Moderate Republicans, Unite!, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/opinion/sunday/moderate-republicans-unite.html?smid
=tw-share; see also Lexington, The Centre Cannot Hold, ECONOMIST (Jan. 14, 2016),
http://www.economist.cominews/united-states/21688393-two-moderate-members-congress-
explain-why-they-are-leaving-centre-cannot-hold [https://perma.cc/T2HT-RS9L].
26. Schleicher, supra note 24, at 454-55.
27. For surveys of the extant research on the causes of polarization, see Michael J.
Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in SOLUTIONS TO
POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA 15, 15-38 (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015).
28. Id. at 34-35.
29. See id. at 31-32.
30. Schleicher, supra note 24, at 451-52 (citing HANS NOEL, POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES
AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA (2013)).
31. Id. at 453.
32. Id. at 471-74.
33. See id. at 451-53.
34. See sources cited supra note 25.
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make me wonder whether the real question we should be asking
is not how to reduce polarization but whether we can. The first
worry is that strengthening the hand of party leaders won't be
enough to overcome the enormous forces of polarization.35
Candidates might very well like to make a deal with party leaders,
but not if the deal costs them their seats. Bob Bauer even suggests
that, as a result, the party leadership may ultimately be forced to
cave and fund candidates despite their extreme positions.36 Put
differently, Issacharoff wants to give the party leaders a better
hand to play, but it doesn't matter how many trump cards you hold
if you are playing in a hurricane.
The other alternative scenario is that Sam's reforms will
work-they will succeed in giving the party leadership sufficient
power over its members to control their behavior. You might think
"mission accomplished," right? Surely if the party leadership can
control its members, we'll see more moderate behavior. But
institutional reform can have unexpected consequences, a lesson
which Sam's own work has long taught us.
Here's the worry: If party leaders become more powerful, they
will become crucial targets for anyone seeking to control the party.
They will become crucial targets, in other words, for the same
polarized activists and donors who are busily focusing their efforts
on candidates right now.3 7 If the DCCC or the RNC or the House
leadership gain enough power to control candidates, those sites
will become ground zero for the fight. Sam's frame explains why
donors and activists are now focused on candidates, not the party
leadership. But it doesn't show that the party leadership can't be
a target as well. For Sam's plan to work, we have to believe that
the party leadership will be immune to the forces that have
polarized everyone else. Again, this isn't to say that Sam is wrong
35. I take it that Bob Bauer worries about this problem as well. He suggests that
there may not be enough political goodies we can offer candidates these days to get them to
moderate. See Bauer, supra note 17, at 888-89, 892.
36. Id. at 889.
37. See Kang, supra note 23, at 601 ("The party leadership, through their party
committees, would draw their new revenue from the same donor class that has funded the
proliferation of outside groups in campaign finance and any resulting polarization from this
decentralization of party politics."); Schultz, supra note 21, at 270 ('Thus, allowing parties
to take more money will only polarize them more as they become entrenched by special
interest money."); Hassell, supra note 16, at 219 ("[W]hile the current political system with
its out of control polarization would benefit from the strengthening of political parties, this
tactic may not necessarily be the antidote to polarization that many hope. A party is the
product of the groups and interests that have a stake in it and are connected to it. As parties
come to incorporate these views, or as certain groups and individuals rise to power within
the organization, these organizations can then be mobilized to advance the political and
ideological preferences of those individuals and groups. Empowering parties seems,
perhaps unsurprisingly, to empower those who control the institution.").
2017] 917
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
in thinking that party leaders have more incentives to moderate
than their members. I simply wonder whether those incentives
will be enough.
To understand the source of this worry, you have to remember
that parties-unlike firms-are themselves sites of contestation.
The more power that resides inside the official party structure, the
more likely it is that party leaders will become targets of the same
polarizing forces now targeting party candidates. Right now, the
NRA and the Koch brothers exercise more control over the House
Republicans than John Boehner ever did, precisely for the reasons
that Sam describes. But if the party leadership become the target,
that's where donors and activists will aim their fire.
Even in today's world-where the easiest path to influence is
through independent spending and pressuring candidates-the
party leadership have hardly been immune to the forces of
polarization. On the GOP side, for instance, for every Boehner
trying for compromise, there is an Eric Cantor rallying the troops
against it.38 Mitch McConnell and Newt Gingrich are hardly poster
children of moderation. To be sure, they are far more likely to
compromise than Ted Cruz or just about any other member of the
Tea Party. But the question we need to ask ourselves isn't whether
today's leadership is less polarized than the party's candidates,
but whether the leadership will become more polarized when
ideological activists and donors concentrate their fire on party
leaders. Right now, you can control the House without controlling
John Boehner or Paul Ryan. But if the only way to control the
House is to control the GOP leadership . . . well, you can see where
I'm going. On this view, the Cruzes of the world won't become more
like the McConnells. Instead, the McConnells will turn into
Cruzes.
Voters and party activists aren't going to make the path to
moderation any easier. Turning to the Democrats, note what
happened when Democratic leaders pushed for the moderate,
establishment-oriented candidate in the Sanders-Clinton race
(precisely what Issacharoff expects party leaders to do). The
reaction was sufficiently strong that the head of the DNC was
forced to resign.39 Similarly, as Sam notes, GOP leaders have
themselves been unable to step in to steer their party in a
38. And even Cantor got primaried. David Nather, Sarah Wheaton & Alex Inestadt,
Accidental Tea Party Leader, POLITICO (June 12, 2014, 6:35 PM), http://www.politico.com/
story/2014/06/dave-brat-eric-cantor-virginia-107804 [https://perma.ce/LP6F-Q4YW].
39. Jonathan Martin & Alan Rappeport, Debbie Wasserman Schultz to Resign D.N. C.
Post, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/25/us/politics/debbie-
wasserman-schultz-dnc-wikileaks-emails.html?smid-tw-share.
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moderate direction.40 If any candidate should have induced the
GOP leadership to step in, it's Trump. And yet the GOP leadership
remains paralyzed.
To make this even more concrete, think about the mainstay
reform advocated by those who worry about the ideological
influence donors exercise through what I've called the "shadow
parties": the Super PACs and 501(c)(4)s.41 If we leveled the
fundraising playing field between the official parties and the
shadow parties, is there any reason to think that the donors won't
seek the same deals inside the party as they now seek outside of
it?42 Deregulation could theoretically strengthen the parties, but
it could also turn them into shadow parties. The official parties,
then, would look a lot like today's Super PACs and 501(c)(4)s-
beholden to a small number of wealthy donors and ideologically
driven activists.43 It's hard to see why the results would be much
different.
I guess we could ban the shadow parties altogether, thereby
ensuring that all the money is funneled through the parties.
Surely that would help some, as the parties are likely to be less
efficient means for translating money into policy than the Super
PACs and (c)(4)s. But still. If the parties pay attention to their
donors, their donors will push them to the extremes. And if the
donors don't, voters and activists might, as the anti-establishment
bias seems to be becoming more pronounced with every election.
As I said, it's a different kind of party than the one V.O. Key was
writing about.
Note that I'm offering a very different conception of the party
than Sam supplies, one that aligns not with Key's work from the
1930s, but the work of the UCLA School during the last few
years.44 The UCLA School depicts parties as a loose collection of
40. Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 861.
41. Heather K. Gerken, The Real Problem with Citizens United: Campaign Finance,
Dark Money, and Shadow Parties, 97 MARQUETTE L. REV. 903, 918 (2014); see also Joseph
Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Party's Over: McCutcheon, Shadow Parties, and the
Future of the Party System, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 175.
42. Michael Kang has made exactly this point. Kang, supra note 23, at 603
("Whatever the role of campaign finance law in setting political responsiveness, the
additional removal of restrictions on party campaign finance may just accelerate the effects
of Super PACs and other forms of deregulation in multiplying the political capacity of the
very rich and their polarizing tendencies."); see also Drutman, supra note 21 ("La Raja and
Shaffner seem to envision parties being run by hard-headed pragmatists who can
determine outcomes with money alone. They seem to assume that if parties can get
billionaires to fund them, this will enable party leaders to support more moderate
candidates. They seem to ignore that the billionaires may have a few ideas of their own
about how they think government should be run (see, e.g.[,] North Carolina).").
43. See Fishkin & Gerken, supra note 41, at 189, 212-13.
44. Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands
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networked interests (the party writ large) and deemphasizes the
sort of party leadership structure Key contemplated (the party
writ small).45 On this view, the GOP has not been, to use Sam's
phrase, "capture[d] by outsiders."46 Instead, those "outsiders" are
insiders to the party writ large even if they are not part of the
party's formal structure.47 What Sam sees as a hostile takeover
instead looks more like a conventional interparty battle. The
battle is just happening in a different part of the party system. The
party writ large is highly polarized, and it's not clear that the party
writ small can do much about that fact.48
While this argument doesn't align with Sam's picture of the
party, it does align with his argument about the hydraulics of
campaign finance, especially if you overlay Michael Kang's
observation that money follows power.49 Even if the party
leadership have more reasons than do individual candidates to
resist the partisan tide pulling them away from the shores of
moderation, everything depends on how strong that tide is. That's
why, as I noted early on, my fear about Sam's paper is that the
real question isn't how to moderate the parties, but whether we
can-whether that tide is just too strong.
Needless to say, these questions matter enormously for any
reform agenda. If we can't moderate the party, then we should
think about adapting our institutions to our politics rather than
changing our politics to fit our institutions. In this respect, Bob
Bauer's paper and mine complement one another. Both Bob and I
are skeptical that legal reform can substantially reduce
polarization.50 I want to think about how to make governance work
in a highly polarized environment, and he wants to think about
how to make parties work in a highly polarized environment.5 1
As I said when I began, the questions I have about Sam's
paper are just that-questions. We cannot know for certain
whether Sam is right or wrong because we don't have a handy
parallel universe to run the experiment. Given the complexities of
polarization's sources and the complex interaction between politics
and Nominations in American Politics, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 571 (2012).
45. Id. at 591.
46. Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 847.
47. See Gerken, supra note 41, at 920 ('These shadow parties are so tied to the
candidate and the parties that politicians can take advantage of everything the formal
party structure has to offer . . . .").
48. See Kang, supra note 23, at 596-97.
49. See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of
Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999). See also Kang, supra note 23, at
563-64.
50. Bauer, supra note 17, at 899.
51. Compare Gerken, supra note 41, at 919, with Bauer, supra note 17, at 908.
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and institutional design, we all should be the opposite of Updike's
king-all questions and no answers.52 But that, it seems to me, is
a luxury we cannot afford. The problems we face are dire, and
Sam's paper is an effort to engage with those problems in a serious
way. Better yet, it's an effort to provide a better frame for all of us
to engage. I don't know whether Sam's paper is right, but it is
pragmatic and scholarly and smart. Those are fine qualities-the
finest of qualities, actually-and qualities I have always, always
associated with Sam.
52. UPDIKE, supra note 8, at 59.
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